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~~~J McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm. Appeal ~from Arizona Ct. of App. 
Appellants, who are Navaho Indians living and working within the can-
s-t c. 
fines of that portion of the Navaho reservation within the ~··' of 
t t 
Arizona, question the constitutionality of the Arizona state income tax -
as applied to them. The Arizona TC affirmed the validity of the tax 
as to income derived sole~y from sources within the reservation and the 
Ct. of App. affirmed. The Arizona Sup.Ct. denied a petition for review. 
Appellants contend that the tax interferes with a longstanding ~Eii£~ 
federal policy mf self government and self determination for the American 
"" Indian . The leading case on tribal self-government is that of Williams v. 
~· 358 U.S.217(1959) where the Court concluded that the basis for txeati 
treaties between the Indians and the federal government was the "understand-
ing that the internal affairs of the Indians remained exclusively within the 
jurisdiction of whatever tribal government existedo" Appellants cite 
~umer~us cases in which the principle of tribal self-government was 
~ffirmed, included Kennerly v. montana District Cqurt, 400U.S.423(1971), 
where this Court held that absent a vote by members of the Blackfoot Tribe o...,.,d 
affirmative action by the s~ate of montana, the state could not assume ~~ 
.,, .. 
jurisdiction over the Blackfeet Keservation ~nder the Act of August 15, 1953. 
"" .. 
The Navaho tribe h~s an effective court system, its own police system, its 
own anti-poverty office, its own welfare program, which apparently are funded 
part with fedreal funds and part with Navaho taxes collected by the tribal 
unit. Appelants argue that the power to tax inheres in self goveDnment and 
that it would be a crippling blow to Navaho self government if the power to 
0- ~ fo.f. 
tax Navaho incomes were granted to t~• •)ats. ' 
Appellants second contention is that Indian relations are subject Et to 
an overall policy of federal pre-emption and that states are powerless to 
act in Indain affairs absent express congressional authorization.Appellants 
- ...---: 
cite Warfenlraa1ng Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Lomm.380 U.S.685(1965) where this 
Cnurt held that Arizona could not tax the gross sales income of a trading post 
a a Nacaho reservation because a comprehensive congressional scheme had been 
set up in order to regulate traders~on reservations. 
In rejecting appellant~ contentions, the ~rizona Ct. of App. ~Ete~ stated 
f( \' ---
that the income tax was a personal tax which affected the individual but E -
in no way threatened tribal autonomy. It pointed out the longstanding practice 
~, ~·~ ) 
of various levels of government levying taxes on another /without affecting the 
others basic prerogatives,e.g. state tax upon federal employees and vice-
versa). It found no comprehensive .2.·a •~111i pre-emption of the field of taxation 
to make the Warrem Trading Post case applicable. ~inally it noted that state 
M 
tax monies of the state of Arizona were being expended for educational and ~eiia 
welfare benefits within the Navaho reservation. 
my own opinion is that this case represents a fairly significant conflict 
between the traditonal federal interest in regulation of Indian affairs, 
BE a~~the Indians' hopes for self government and the power of a state to tax 
those residing within its borders. The minnesota Supreme Court viewed this ques-
, fion and and reached exactly the opposite conclusion from the Arizona 
• .... 'e .cB.ut't ·in this c;se. One prece·d~~t, Leahy v: 5"tat~ f~easo of Okl..atJ.omalft} v.s. ttz.b J 
- " ' --- (.1'13b 
held that an income tax by the state of Oklahoma on moneys received 
by a member of the Osage tribe as his share of income from mineral 
resources held by the United States for the tribe was taxable by the 
stateo i~i Much has gone on since then )howeverpand even Leahy was a ~~i 
quick summary E~i~iE~ one pa~e opiniono 
I am inclined on balance to believe that d~spite the inequities and 
abuses in their past history and dealings with this country that Indians 
still should be subject to states income taxation. Indians do derive 
benefits from the expenditure of state tax revenues and we have 
no other ethnic or ciltural group to escape the consequences of the 
taxing powero I do not believe that the state tax here poses a fund-
amental threat to the uniqueness of Indain civilaization or to their 
Ega dreams for self determinationo Still, the question seems important 
and if sentiment exists elsewhere for a hearing, I would ~Ei~ 
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DISCUSS 
At an earlier conference the views of the SG were invited. 
The SG a a~ a has now submitted a memorandum of ~~x which the -saiix salient points are as follows1 
r. A.s 
(1)- When Comgress ~wished the states to tax Indians within 
a reservation, it has done so by carefully delineated legislation. 
"Since Congress has passed no law authorizing t~e state taxation of 
income earned ~ithin a reservation, the decision of the c~rt below, 
upholding the authrity of the State to impose s~~~ such a tax 
seems incorrect on this ~round al~e." ,. 
(2)-"In any event the decision below is inconsistent with the 
particular legal relationship that exists between Arizona an6 the 
Indianso ~~~~ When Arizona was admitted to the Union it ax agreed 
to "forever disclaim all right and title to Indian lands and that -
the same shall remain under the absolute jurisdiction and control of 
the Congress of the United States." 
(3)-- "The question of whether and under what circumstances 
a State~ tax income earned within a reservation by Indians who 
live on the reservation therefore warrants the attention of this 
Court. 
It's hard to get very ~hrilleda about the concepts in this 
case, and I wish the Court did not have to take it, but in good conscience 
I feel the problems are significant enoggh to recommend a 
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Mn. JusTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
This case requires us once again to reconcile the plenary 
power of the States over residents within their borders 
with the semi-autonimous status of Indians living on 
tribal reservations. In this instance, the problem arises 
in the context of Arizona's efforts to impose its personal 
income tax on a reservation Indian whose entire income 
derives from reservation sources. Although we have re-
peatedly addressed the question of state taxation of res-
ervation Indians,' the problems posed by a state income 
tax are apparently of first impression in this Court. 2 
The Arizona courts have held that such state taxation is 
permissible. See McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax 
' Sec, e. g., Oklahoma Tax Commission v. United States, 31!) U. S. 
598 (194:-l); Childers v. Beaver, 270 U. S. 5.55 (1926); United States 
v. Rickert, 188 U. S. 432 (1903); The Kansas indians, 72 U. S. 
(5 Wall.) 732 (1867). Cf. Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1 (1956) . 
"State courts have disagreed on the quc8tion. Compare Ghahate 
v. Bttreau of Revenue, 80 N. M. 98, 451 P. 2d 1002 (1969), with 
Commissioner of Taxation v. Brun, 2 6 Minn. 43, 174 N. \V. 2d 120 
(1970). See Powless v. State Tax Commission, 253 N. Y. S. 2d 438 
(1964); State Tax Commission v. Barnes, 178 N.Y. S. 2d 932 (195~). 
-------
71-834-0 PINION 
2 McCLANAHAN v. ARIZONA STATE TAX COMM'N 
Commission, 14 Ariz. App. 452, 484 P. 2d 222 ( 1971). 
We noted probable jurisdiction, 406 U.S. 016 (1972) , and 
now reverse. \Yc hold that by imposing the tax in ques-
tion on this appellant, the State has interfered with mat-
ters which the relevant treaty and statutes leave to the 
exclusive province of the Federal Government and the 
Indians themselves. The tax is therefore unlawful as 
applied to reservation Indians with income derived wholly 
from reservation sources. 
I 
Appellant is an enrolled member of the Navajo tl'ibe 
who lives on that portion of the Navajo reservation lo-
cated within the State of Arizona. Her complaint al-
leges that all her income earned during 1967 was derived 
from within the Navajo reservation. Pursuant to Ariz. 
Rev. Stat. ~ 43- 188 (f), $16.29 were withheld from her 
·wages for that year to cover her state income tax lia-
bility. :~ At the conclusion of the tax year, appellant filed 
a protest against the collection of any taxes on her in-
come and a claim for a refund of the entire amount 
withheld from her wages. When no action ''"as taken 
on her claim, she instituted this action in Arizona Su-
perior Court on behalf of herself and those similarly 
situated, demanding a return of the money withheld and 
a declaration that the state tax was unlawful as applied 
to reservation Indians. 
"Thr liabilit~· was crcatrd b~· Ariz. Rr,·. Stat. § .J.:~-102 (a) which, 
in rrJr,·ant part , pro,·idrH: "ThNr ~hall br l<',·i<'d , rollert rd . and paid 
for Pach tnxnhlo yrar upon the rntirr nrt incom<' of rvN.\" r~tntr or 
trust taxnblr upon thiH titlr and of c\·cr~' rc~idrnt of thi~ ~tatr and 
upon the Pntirr net in rome of rvPry Hon-rrHidPnt whirh i~ dNi,·cd 
from ~ourrr~ within thi::; Ht:tt e, tnxr~ in thr following amount ~ :mel 
nt thr following ratPs upon the amount of 11rt inconw in rxrr~H of 
c·rrdit::; agai n~t nrt incomr pro,·iclrd in §§ 4:)-127 and .J.::l- 12~. " . .\p-
]WIIant concrdcd hrlow th:lt ~he wa~ a "rc"idrnt " within thr ml'aning 
of thr statute, and that qurstion, which in any rYrnt po~<'S an i~~ ur 
or Htatr la\Y, i ~ not now before UH. 
71-~:34-0PI~ION 
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The trial court dismissed the action for failure to 
state a claim, and the Ari7.ona Court of Appeals affirmed. 
Citing this Court's decision in ·will·iams v. Lee, 358 U. S. 
217 ( 1950) , the Court of Appeals hold that tho test "is 
not \\'hether the Ariwna state income tax infringes on 
plaintiff's right as an individual :Navajo Indian, but 
whether such a tax infringes on the dghts of tho Navajo 
tribe of Indians to be self-governing." 14 Ariz. App., at 
454. 484 P. 2d, at 223. The Court thus distinguished 
cases dealing with state taxes on Indian real property on 
the ground that those taxes, unlike tho personal income 
tax, infringed tribal autonomy. 
The Court then pointed to cases holding that state 
employees could be required to pay federal income tax 
and that the State had a concomitant right to tax fed-· 
eral 01nployees. See H elvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U. S. 
405 (1038); Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 
U. S. 466 ( 1039). Reasoning by analogy from these 
cases, the Court argued that Arizona's income tax on in-
dividual Navajo Indians did not "rcause] an impairment 
of tho right of the Navajo tribe to be self-governing." 
14 Ariz. App., at 455, 484 P. 2d. at 224. 
Nor did the Court find anything in the Arizona En-
abling Act. 36 Stat. 569, to prevent the State from 
taxing reservation Indians. That Act. the relevant lan-
guage of \vhich is duplicated in the Arizona Constitution, 
disclaims state title over Indian lands and requires that 
such lands shall remain "under tho absolute jurisdiction 
and control of the Congress of the United States." But 
the Arizona court, relying on this Court's decision in 
Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60 (1962), 
hold that the Enabling Act nonetheless permitted con-
current state jurisdiction so long as tribal self-govern-
ment remained intact. Since an individual income tax 
did not interfere with tribal self-government, it followed 
that appellant had failed to state a claim. The Arizona 
71-834-0PINION 
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Supreme Court denied a petition for review of this de-
cision, and the case came here on appeal. Sec 28 U.S. C. 
§ 1257 (2) . 
II 
It may be helpful to begin our discussion of the law 
applicable to this complex area with a brief statement of 
what this case does not involve. W c are not here deal-
ing with ~ or never inhabited reser-
vations set aside for their exclusive use or who do not 
possess the usual accoutrements of tribal self-govern-
ment. See, e. g., Organized Village of Kake Y. Egan, 
369 U. S. 60 (1962); Metlakatla Indian Community v. 
Egan, 369 U.S. 45 (1962); Oklahoma Tax Co·mmission v. 
United States, 319 U. S. 598 (1943). Nor are we con-
cm·ned with exertions of state sovereignty over non-
Indians who undertake activity on Indian reservations. 
See, e. g., Thomas v. Gray, 169 U. S. 264 (1898); Utah 
Northern R. Co. v. Fisher, 116 U. S. 28 (1885). Cf. 
Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook, 281 U. S. 647, 651 (1930). 
Nor, finally, is this a case where the State seeks to reach 
activity undertaken by reservation Indians on nonreser-
vation lands. See, e. g., 'The M escalaro Apache Tribe v. 
Jones, post. Rather, this case involves the narrow ques- ~ 
tion whether the State may tax a reservation Indian for 
income earned exclusiv ly on the reservation. 
The prmCiples governing e reso ution o this ques-
tion are not new. On the contrary, "[tlhe policy of 
leaving Indians free from state jurisdiction and control 
is deeply rooted in the Nation's history." Rice v. Olson, 
324 U. S. 786, 789 (1945). This policy was first articu-
lated by this Court 140 years ago when Chief Justice 
Marshall held that Indian nations were "distinct po-
litical communities, having territorial boundaries, within 
which their authority is exclusive, and having a right to 
all the lands within those boundaries, which is not only 
71-834-0PINION 
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acknowledged but guaranteed by the United States."· 
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U. S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). It 
followed from this concept of Indian reservations as sep-. 
arate, although dependent nations, that state law could 
have no role to plav within the reservation boundaries. 
"The Cherokee nation ... is a distinct community oc-· 
cupying its own territory, with boundaries accurately 
described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no force, 
and which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter, 
but ''"ith the assent of the Cherokees themselves, or in 
conformity with treaties, and with the acts of Congress. 
The whole intercourse between the United States and 
this nation, is, by our Constitution and laws, vested in 
the government of the United States." Worcester v. 
Georgia, supra, at 561. See also United States v .. 
Kagama, 118 U. S. 375 (1886); Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 
U. S. 556 (1883). 
Although Worcester on its facts dealt with a. State's 
efforts to extend its criminal jurisdiction to reservation 
lands/ the rationale of the case plainly extended to state 
taxation within the reservation as well. Thus, in 'The 
Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737 (1867), the Court 
unambiguously rejected state efforts to impose a land 
tax on reservation Indians. "If the tribal organization 
of the Shawnees is preserved intact, and recognized by 
the political department of the government as existing,. 
then they are a 'people distinct from others,' capable of 
making treaties, separated from the jurisdiction of Kan-
sas, and to be governed exclusively by the government 
of the Union. If under the control of Congress, from 
necessity there can be no divided authority." 72 U. S., 
at 755. See also The New York Indians, 72 U. S. (5 
Wall.) 761 (1866). 
'See also Williams v. United States, 327 U. S. 711 (1945); United 
States v. Chavez, 290 U. S. 357 (1933); United States v. Ramsey, 
271 U. S. 457 (1925). 
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It is true, as the State asserts, that some of the later 
Indian tax cases turn not on the Indian sovereignty doc-
trine, but on whether or not the State can be said to 
have imposed a forbidden tax on a federal instrumen-
tality. Sec, e. g., Leahy v. State Treasurer of Oklahoma, 
297 U. S. 420 (1936); United States v. Rickerl, 188 U.S. 
432 ( 1903). To the extent that the tax exemption rests 
on federal immunity from state taxation, it may well be 
inapplicable in a case such as this involving an individual 
income tax." But it would vastly oversimplify the prob-
lem to say that nothing remains of the notion that reser-
vation Indians are a separate people to whom state ju-
risdiction, and therefore state tax legislation, may not 
extend. Thus, only a few years ago, this Court struck 
clown Arizona's attempt to tax the proceeds of a trading 
company doing business "·ithin the confines of the very 
reservation involved in this case. See Wan·en Trading 
Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Commission, 380 U. S. 685 
(1965). The tax in no way interfered with federal 
land or with the National Government's proprietary in-
terests. But it was invalidated nonetheless because "from 
the very first days of our Government, the Federal Gov-
ernment had been permitting the Indians largely to 
govern themscl ves, free from state interference." 380 
U. S., at 687." As a leading text on Indian problems 
'The frdrral instrunwntalit.'· clortrinc do<'~ not prohibit ~tatr 
taxa I ion of indi,·idu:-tls drri,·inp; thrir incomc from frciN:tl :-<ourrc~. 
Sr(' Gm1'('8 Y. Neu> York l'X rel. O'Keefe,;)()() P. S. 466 (H):l9). cr. 
Leahy v. State Trensvrer of Oklahoma, 297 U. S. 420 (19:36). The 
dort rinc ha!', in n n~· P\·rnt, bccn ~ha rpl~· I imitrcl with rC':-<prct to 
Indinn~. Srr 01.-/ahoma Ta.v Commission , .. Uuited Slates. :)[~) F. S. 
50~ ( 1943). 
r. The Court lwlo\\· di,-tinguif'ilC'd TVm-re11 Trading .Post :t" limitrd to 
ra"r" whrrr thr Fcd<'ral C:on'rnmC'nt ha~ prr-rmptrd ~tatr Ja\Y by 
rC'g:ulatinp; Indian tradcr~ in a manner inron~i~trnl with :-;late taxa-
tion. SC'r 14 Ariz. App. , at 45.'i, 484 1'. 2d, ~~t 224. But :d though 
I hr Court wa,-, no doubt , influrnced b~· the frdrr:d licrn~inp: rC'qnirc-
McCLANAHAN v. ARIZONA STATE TAX COMM'N 7 
summarizes the relevant law "State Jaws generally are 
not applicable to tribal Indians on an Indian reservation 
exrept where Congress has expressly provided that state 
laws shall apply. It follows that Indians and Indian 
property on an Indian reservation are not subject to statr-
taxation except by virtue of express authority conferred 
upon the State by act of Congress." United States De-
partment of Interior. Federal Indian Law 845 (1958) 
(hereinafter cited as Federal Indian Law). 
This is not to say that the Indian sovereignty doctrine, 
with its concomitant jurisdictional limit on the reach of 
state law, has remained static during the 140 years since 
Worcester was decided. Not surprisingly, the doctrine 
has undergone considerable evolution in response to 
changer\ circumstances. As noted above, the doctrine 
has not been rigidly applied in cases where Indians have 
left the reservation and become assimilated into the 
general community. See, e. g., Oklahmna Tax Commis-
sion Y. United Slates, 319 U. S. 598 (1943). Similarly, 
notions of Indian sovereignty have been adjusted to take 
account of the State's legitimate interests in regulating 
the affairs of non-Indians. See, e. g., New York ex ret. 
Ray Y. Martin, 326 U. S. 496 (1946); Dmper v. United 
States, 164 U. S. 240 (1896); Utah & Northern R. Co. 
v. Fisher, 116 U. S. 28 (1885). This line of cases "·as 
smnmarized in this Court's landmark decision in Williams 
v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959): "Over the years this Court 
has modified [the Worcester principle l in cases where· 
mrnts, thr rra~oninp; of H'arren 'I'mdina Post cannot br ~o rr~trictrd. 
Tho Court. inn1liclatrd Arizona's tax in part bcrau~o "Congrrss 
lm~, sinrr thr crration of tho N:wa.io Rrscn·ation nrarlr a crntury 
ago, lrft thr Indian::; on it largrl~· frC'r to run the rc~rn·ation and 
its affairs without statf' control. a ]1olir~· which hns automatically 
rrlirvrd Arizona of nil hurclcnf:' for r;trrying on t ho~r same respon-
sibilitie;-;." lVarreu 'I'radina Post Co. 1·. Arizona 'I'm: Commission,. 
81/]Jra, at 690. 
71-834-0PINION 
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essential tribal relations were not involved and where 
the right of Indians would not be jeopardized. . . . Thus, 
suits by Indians against outsiders in state courts have 
been sanctioned . . . . And state courts have been al-
lowed to try non-Indians "·ho committed crimes against 
each other on a reservation. . . . But if the crime was 
by or against an Indian, tribal jurisdiction or that ex-
pressly conferred on other courts by Congress has re-
mained exclusive. . . . Essentially, absent governing 
Acts of Congress, the question has always been whether 
the state action infringes on tho right of reservation 
Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them." 
358 U. S., at 220. 
Finally, the trend has been away from the idea of in-
herent Indian sovereignty as a bar to state jurisdiction 
and toward reliance on federal pre-emption.' See The 
M escalaro Apache Tr,ibe v. Jones, post. The modern 
cases thus tend to avoid reliance on Platonic notions of 
Indian sovereignty and to look instead to the applicable 
treaties and statutes which define the limits of state 
power. Compare, e. g., United States v. Kagama, 118 
U. S. 375 (1886), with Kennerly v. District Court, 400 
U. S. 423 (1971).8 
7 The sourne of federal authority over Indian matters has been 
the subject of some confu~ion, but it i~ now generally recognized 
that. the power derives from federal re~ponsibility for regulating rom-
mcrre with Indian tribes and for treaty making. Sec U. S. Const. 
Art. I, § 8, cl. 3; Art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Sec also Williams v. Lee, 358 
U. S. 217, 219 n. 4; Perrin v. United States, 232 U. S. 478, 482 
(1914); Federal Indian Law 3. 
s The extent of federal pre-emption and rrsidual Indian sovrrcignty 
in the total absence of federal treaty obligations or legislation is 
therefore now something of a moot question. Cf. Organized Village 
of Kake v. Egan, 369 U. S. 60, 62 (1962); Federal Indian Law 846. 
The question is generally of little more than t heorct irnl importance, 
however, since in almost all casrs, federal treaties and statutes define 
thr boundaries of federal and state jurisdiction. 
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The Indian sovereignty doctrine is relevant, then, not 
because it provides a definitive resolution of the issues in 
this suit, but because it provides a backdrop against 
which the applicable treaties and federal statutes must 
be read. It must ahvays be remembered that the various 
Indian tribes were once independent and sovereign na-
tions, and that their claim to sovereignty long predates 
that of our own Government. Indians today are Ameri-
can citizens. 9 They have the right to vote,10 to use 
state courts/' and they receive some state services.1 ~ 
But it is nonetheless still true, as it was in the last cen-
tury, that "The relation of the Indian tribes living 
within the borders of the United States [is] an anoma-
lous one and of a complex character. . . . They were, 
and always have been, regarded as having a semi-inde-
pendent position when they preserved their tribal rela-
tions; not as states, not as nations, not as possessed of 
the full attributes of sovereignty, but as a separate 
people, with the power of regulating their internal and 
social relations, and thus far not brought under the laws 
of the Union or of the State within whose limits they 
9 See 8 U. S. C. § 1401 (a) (2). 
10 See, e. g., Harrison v. Laveen, 67 Ariz. 337, 196 P. 2d 456 (1948). 
11 Sec, e. g., Felix v. Patrick, 145 U. S. 317, 332 (1892). 
1 ~ The Court below pointed out that Arizona was expending tax 
monies for education and welfare within the confines of the Navajo 
reservation. See 14 Ariz. App., at 456-457, 484 P. 2d, at 225-226. 
It should be noted , however, that the Federal Government defrays 
80% of Arizona's ordinary social security payments to reservation 
Indians, sec 25 U. S. C. § 639, and has authorized the expenditure of 
more than S88 million for rehabilitation programs for Navajos and 
Hopis living on re::;ervalions. See also 25 U. S. C. §§ 13, 309, 309a 
(federal support for Indian education). Moreover, "Lc]onferring 
rights and privileges upon these Indians cannot ::dTcct their situation, 
which can only be changed by treaty, stipulation, or a voluntary 
abandonment of their tribal organization." The Kamas Indiam, 72 
U. S. (5 Wall.) 737, 757 (1867). 
7H~:3-1-0PINION 
10 McCLANAHAN v. ARIZONA ST:\TE TAX COMM'N 
reside." United States Y. Kagmna, 118 U. S. 375, 381-
382 (1886). 
III 
When the relevant treaties and statutes arc read with 
this tradition of sovereignty in mind, we think it clear 
that Arizona has exceeded its lawful authority by at-
tempting to tax appellant. The beginning of our analysis 
must be with the treaty which the United States Gov-
ernment entered with the Navajo nation in 1868. The 
agreement provided. in relevant part, that a prescribed 
reservation would be set aside "for the use and occupa-
tion of the Navajo tribe of Indians" and that "no per-
sons except those herein authorized to do, and except 
such officers, soldiers, agents, and employes of the gov-
ernment, or of the Indians, as may be authorized to enter 
Indian reservations in discharge of duties imposed by 
law, or the orders of the President, shall ever be per-
mitted to pass over, settle upon, or reside in, the terri-
tory described in this article." 15 Stat. 667, 668 (1868). 
The treaty nowhere explicitly states that the Navajo 
were to be free from state law or exempt from state 
taxes. But the document is not to be read as an ordi-
nary contract agreed upon by parties dealing at arms 
length v;ith equal bargaining positions. We have had 
occasion in the past to describe the circumstances under 
which the agreement was reached. "At the time this 
document ·was signed the Navajos were an exiled people 
forced by the United States to live crowded together on 
a small piece of land on the Pecos river in eastern New 
Mexico, some 300 miles cast of the area they had occu-
pied before the coming of the white man. In return for 
their promise to keep peace, this tretay 'set apart' for 
'their permanent home' a portion of what had been their 
native country." Williams v. Lee, 358 U. S. 217. 221 
(1959). 
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It is circumstances such as these which have led this 
Court in interpreting Indian treaties, to adopt the gen-
eral rule that "Doubtful expressions are to be resolved 
in favor of the weak and defenseless people who are 
wards of the nation, dependent upon its protection and 
good faith." Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U. S. 363, 367 
( 1030). When this canon of construction is taken to-
gether with the tradition of Indian independence de-
scribed above, it cannot be doubted that the reservation 
of certain lands for the exclusive use and occupancy of 
the Navajo and the exclusion of non-Navajos from the 
prescribed area was meant to establish the lands as within 
the exclusive sovereignty of tlw Navajos under general 
federal supervision. It is thus unsurprising that this 
Court has interpreted the Navajo treaty to preclude ex-
tension of state law-including state tax law-to Indians 
on the Navajo reservation. Sec TV arren Trading Post 
Co. v. Ar·izona Tax Commission, 380 U. S. 685. 687, 690 
(196.5); Williams v. Lee, supra, at 221-222 (1950). 
Moreover, since the signing of the Navajo treaty, Con-
gress has consistently acted upon the assumption that 
the States lacked jurisdiction over Navajos living on the 
reservation. 1 ~ Thus, when Arizona entered the Union, 
its entry was expressly conditioned on the promise that 
the State would "forever clif.'claim all right and title 
to ... all lands lying within said boundaries owned or 
held by any Indian or Indian tribes, the right or title 
to ·which shall have been acquired through and from the 
United States or any prior sovereignty, and that until 
1'' "Coul!:r<'~~ hn~ ... acted con~istrntl~ · upon thr a~,;umption 1hat 
thr State;; ha1·r no power to rel!:uln1r the affair~ of lndi:tns on a 
rr.,;riTation. . . . Signific:wtl.1·, when Congre~s ha;; a~ked the States 
to cxcrci;;r thi~ powrr it hn;; exprr~;;J.,· gmnted thrm thr juri~diction 
which Worcestl'r v. Georgia had denied." Williams , .. Lei', ;j3R U. S. 
217, 220-221 (1959). 
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the title of such Indian or Indian tribes shall have been 
extinguished the sarne shall be and remain subject to 
the disposition and under the absolute jurisdiction and 
control of the United States." Arizona Enabling Act, 36 
Stat. 557, 560 (1910). 1 ' 
Nor is the Arizona Enabling Act silent on the specific 
question of tax immunity. The Act expressly provides 
that "nothing herein, or in the ordinance herein pro-
vided for. shall preclude the said State from taxing as 
other lands and other property are taxed any lands and 
other property outs1:de of an Indian reservation owned or 
held by an Indian." Ibid. (emphasis added). It is true, 
of course, that exemptions from tax laws should, as a 
general rule, by clearly expressed. But we have in the 
past construed language far more ambiguous than this 
as providing a tax exemption for Indians. See, e. g., 
Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U. S. 1, 6 (1956), and we see 
no reason to give this language an especially crabbed or 
restrictive meaning.n 
Indeed, Congress' intent to maintain the tax exempt 
status of reservation Indians is especially clear in light 
of the Buck Act, 4 U. S. C. § 104 et seq., which provides 
comprehensive federal guidance for state taxation of those 
14 This languagC' is duplicated in Arizona';,; own ronNtitution. Sec 
Ariz. Canst., Art. 20, ~ 4. It is alco contained in the Enabling 
Acts of New Mexico and Utah, the other States in which tho Navajo 
Rrservation is located. Sre Now Mexico Enabling Act, 36 Stat. 558-
550; Utah Enabling Act, 28 Stat. 10 . 
'"There is nothing in Organized Village of Kake v. Egan. 369 U.S. 
60 (1062), to the contrary. In Egan, we held that "'absolute' fed-
C'ral jurisdiction is not invariably exclu"ive jurisdiction," and that 
this language in federal legislation did not preclude the cxcrci~c of 
ro~idnal state authority. See 369 U. S., at 68. But that holding 
came in the context of a decision concerning tho fishing rights of 
nonreservation Indians. Sec 369 U. S., at 62. It did not purport 
to provide guidelinrs for tho exorci e of state authority in area::; ~ot 
aHido by troat.y for tho exclusive use and control of Indians. 
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living within federal areas. Section 106 (a) of Title 4 
grants to the States general authority to impose an in-
come tax on residents of federal areas, but ~ 109 expressly 
provides that ''Nothing in sections 105 and 106 of this 
title shall be deemed to authorize the levy or collection of 
any tax on or from any Indian not otherwise taxed." To 
be sure, the language of the statute itself does not make 
clear whether the reference to "any Indian not other-
wise taxed" was intended to apply to reservation Indians 
earning their income on the reservation. But the legisla-
tive history makes plain that this proviso was meant to 
except reservation Indians from coverage of the Buck 
Act, see S. Rep. No. 1625, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., 2, 4; 
84 Con g. Rec. 10685 ( 1939), and this Court has so 
interpreted it. See Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona 
Tax Commission, 380 U.S. 685, 691 n. 18 (1965). While 
the Buck Act itself cannot be read as an affirmative 
grant of tax exempt status to reservation Indians, it 
should be obvious that Congress would not have jealously 
protected the immunity of reservation Indians from state 
income taxes had it thought that the States had residual 
power to impose such taxes in any event. Similarly, 
narrower statutes authorizing States to assert tax juris-
diction over reservations in special situations are explic-
able only if Congress assumed that the States lacked the 
power to impose the taxes without special authorization.16 
Finally, it should be noted that Congress has now pro-
vided a method whereby States may assume jurisdiction 
over reservation Indians. Title 25 U. S. C. § 1322 (a) 
grants the consent of the United States to States wishing 
to assume criminal and civil jurisdiction over reservation 
IG Sec, e. g., 25 U. S. C. § 398 (rong;re~~ional authorization for 
States to tax mineral production on unallot ted t riballands). Cf. 18 
U. S. C. § 1161 (state liquor laws may be applicable within re~en·a­
tions); 25 U. S. C. § 231 (state health and education laws may be 
n pplicable with in rc. ·ervation). 
.. 
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Indians, and 25 U. S. C. § 1324 confers upon the States 
the right to disregard enabling acts which limit their 
authority over such Indians. But the Act expressly 
provides that the State must act '\Yith the consent of 
the tribe occupying the particular Indian country," 25 
U. S. C. § 1322 (a). 1' and must "appropriately amend 
r its l constitution or statutes." Once again, the Act 
cannot be read as expressly conferring tax immunity 
upon Indians. But we cannot believe that Congress 
would have required the consent of the Indians affected 
and the amendment of the state constitution if the 
States were free to accomplish the same goal unilaterally 
by simple legislative enactment. Sec Kennerly v. D?·s-
trict C ouTt, 400 U. S. 423 ( 1971). 
Arizona, of course, has neither amended its constitu-
tion to permit taxation of the Navajos nor secured the 
consent of the Indians affected. Indeed, a startling 
aspect of this case is that appellee apparently concedes 
that. in the absence of compliance with 25 U. S. C. 
§ 1322 (a), the Arizona courts can exercise neither civil 
nor criminal jurisdiction over reservation Indians. See 
"A~ pa~~rd in HJ.'j:~ , Pub. L. 2SO, 67 Stat. 58R, ddrgntrd ci,·il 
:md criminal juri~diction OYer Indi:m re~erYat ion~ to rertnin Rtntrs, 
nlthongh 'lot to .\rir-ona. SrC' lR lT. S.C.§ 1162: 2S U.S. C.§ 13fi0. 
Thr original Art abo providC'd a me:m~ whrrrb~· ot hrr State~ roulcl 
:1~~unw .iuri~dirt ion oyrr Indian re~cn·nt iom; without t hr eorw'nt of 
tlrr trihr :1ffc•rt c·d. Rrr 67 Stnt. .'i90. Ho\\·r,·rr , in 1968, Cong:rr~::; 
pa~~rd tlrr Indi:w Ci1·il Right~ Art whieh changrd thr prior pro-
rrclnrr to rrqnirr thr con~rnt of tlrr Indian~ inYohwl brforr :1 State• 
mrs prrmittrd to n~~unw ,imi,dirtion. Srr 25 LT. S. C. § 13:2:2 (a). 
Thn~. h:1d it wi.<hrd to do ~o, .\ rizona could haYr unila teraliY Hc':'Uillf'd 
juri-<diction o1·rr it~ portion of thr N:n·aio Tir"rn·ation at an_,. point 
dming thr l.'i ~·r:H:-i brtwrrn 1953 and HWS. But although tlrr St:rtr 
did p:r ~~ narrow lrgi~lation plll'port ing to rrquirr the cnfon·rmrnt of 
air and watrr pollution ~tandnnl~ within rr~rl'\·at ion~. ~rr 3fi Ari7.. 
Rr1·. Rtat. (Cnm. Snpp.) § lROl ; :w Ariz. HeY. Stat. (C'nm. Supp.) 
~ 1R6.'i, it c!Prlined to n~~nmr fnll rrspon~ibilitY for the 1ndi<ll1~ during 
thr prriod whrn it had thr opportunit~· to do ~o. 
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appellee's brief, at 24-26.'s But the appellee nowhere 
explains how, without such jurisdiction, the State's tax 
may either be imposed or collected. Cf. Transcript of 
oral argument, at 38-39. Unless the State is willing to 
defend the position that it may constitutionally admill-
istrr its tax system altogther without judicial interven-
tion, cf. Ward v. Love, 253 U. S. 17 (1920), the ad-
mitted absence of either civil or criminal jurisdiction 
would seem to dispose of the case. 
IV 
\Vhen Arizona's contentions are measured against these 
statutory imperatives, they a.re simply untenable. The 
State relics primarily upon language in Williams v. Lee 
stating that the test for determining the validity of state 
action is "whether [it] infringed on the right of reserva-
tion Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by 
thenL" 358 U. S., at 220. Since Arizona has attempted 
to tax individual Indians and not the tribe or reserva-
tion as such, it argues that it has not infringed on Indian 
rights of self-government. 
In fact, we are far from convinced that when a State 
imposes taxes upon reservation members without their 
consent, its action can be reconciled with tribal self-
determination. But even if the State's premise is ac-
cepted, we reject the suggestion that the Williams test 
was meant to apply in this situation. It must be remem-
bered that Williams, and the cases following it, have all 
dealt either with non-Indians or with activity outside 
the reservation. In these situations, both the Tribe and 
the State could fairly claim an interest in asserting their 
respective jurisdictions. The Williams test was designed 
to resolve this conflict by providing that the State could 
'"In light of our prior rnsrs, npprllrc hn~ no choice but to mnke 
this concc~~ion. Sec, e. g., Kennerly v. District Court, supra; United 
8tates , .. Kasama, 118 U. S. 375 (1886). 
J 
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protect its interests up to the point where tr.ibal self-
government would be affected. 
The problem posed by this case is completely different. 
Since appellant is an Indian and since her income is 
derived wholly from reservation sources. her activity is 
totally within the sphere which the relevant treaties and 
statutes leave for the Federal Government and for the 
Indians themselves. Appellee cites us to no cases hold-
ing that this legislation may be ignored simply because 
tribal self-government has not been infringed.tn On the 
contrary, this Court expressly rejected such a position 
only two years a.go. 2" In Kennerly v. District Court, 
400 U. S. 423 (1971), the Blackfeet Indian Tribe had 
voted to make state jurisdiction concurrent within the 
reservation. Although the State had not complied with 
the procedural prerequisites for the assumption of juris-
diction, it argued that it was nonetheless entitled to extend 
its laws to the reservation since such action was obviously 
consistent with the wishes of the Tribe and, therefore, 
with tribal self-government. But we held that the Wil-
liams rule was inapplicable and that "the unilateral action 
of the Tribal Council was insufficient to vest Montana 
with jurisdiction." 400 U. S., at 427. If Montana may 
not assume jurisdiction over the Blackfeet by simple 
legislation even when the Tribe itself agrees to be bound 
by state law, it surely follows that Ariwna may not 
assume such jurisdiction in the absence of tribal 
agreement. 
1 :> 01'ganized Village of K.ake v. Egan, 369 U. S. GO (1962) iH not. 
such a case. See n. 15, supra. 
""Indeed, tho position was expres~ly rejrctrd in Williams, itself, 
1.1pon which appellee so heavily relics. Williams hold that "absent 
governing Acts of Cong1'ess, tho question has always born whether 
the state action infringed on the right of reservation Indian8 to 
make their own laws and be ruled by them." 358 U. S., at. 2~0 
(emphasis added). 
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Nor is the State's attempted distinction between taxes 
ou land and on income availing. Indeed, it is somewhat 
surprising that the State adheres to this distinction in 
light of our decision in Warren Trading Post Co. v. Ari-
zona Ta.1: Commission, supra, wherein we invalidated an 
·income tax which Arizona had attempted to impose 
within the Navajo Reservation. The land-income dis-
tinction may have some bearing on the validity of a 
ta.x resisted a.s an illegal levy on a federal instrumentality. 
Compare Childers v. Beaver, 270 U. S. 555 (1926), with 
Leahy v. State Treasurer of Oklahoma, 297 U. S. 420 
(1936). See generally Oklahoma Tax Com:mission v. 
United States, 319 U.S. 598 (1943). But the distinction 
is plainly irrelevant when the tax is resisted because the 
State is totally lacking in jurisdiction over both the peo-
ple and the lands which it seeks to tax. 
Finally. we cannot accept the notion that it is irrelevant 
"whether the ... ~frmges on [appel-
lant's] right as an individ~al Navajo Indian," as the 
State Court ' of Appeals maintained. McClanahan v. 
Arizona State Tax Com.mission, 14 Ariz. App. 452, 454, 
484 P. 2d 221, 223 (1970). To be sure, when Congress 
has legislated on Indian matters, it has, most often, dealt 
with the tribes as collective entities. But those entities 
are, after all, composed of individual Indians, and the leg-
islation confers iudividual rights. This Court has there-
fore held that "the question has always been whether 
the state action infringed on the right of reservation 
Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them." 
Williams v. Lee, supra, at 220. In this case, appellant's 
rights as a reservation Indian were violated when the 
state collected a tax from her which it had no jurisdiction 
to impose. Accordingly, the judgment of the court be-
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